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Resumo 
Considerando que vivemos em tempos de convergências - a convergência tecnológica ao redor da 
tela e a convergência espacial e temporal que vemos em termos de conteúdo - proponho que tais 
convergências são baseadas em uma convergência fundamental, que é a do mundo com o cinema. 
Ademais, argumento que tal convergência está fundada em uma ideologia corrente da divergência, 
divisão, separação e da hierarquização. Em suma, o cinema continua como sempre foi, um negócio. 
Mas talvez mais importante seja perceber que o negócio está cada vez mais se tornando cinema. 
Palavras-chave: Convergência; hierarquização; não-cinema. 
Abstract 
Considering that we are living in an age of convergences – the technological convergence around 
the screen, and the spatial and temporal convergence that we see in terms of film content – I wish to 
argue today that these are based upon a more fundamental convergence, which is the convergence of 
the world in cinema. Furthermore, I shall argue that this convergence is itself predicated upon an 
ongoing ideology of divergence, of division, of separation, and of hierarchisation. In short, cinema 
continues to be business as usual. But perhaps more importantly, business as usual is increasingly 
becoming cinema.  
Keywords: Convergence; hierarquisation; non-cinema. 
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Given the fundamental division that is at the heart of the computer, it is 
ironic that contemporary cinema depicts worlds without boundaries, as 
cameras pass from inside to outside of human bodies, through walls, and 
across galaxies in order to provide us with photorealistic images of 
continuous spaces. Furthermore, the digital computer-camera can record 
for so long now that there is a continuity of time in addition to a continuity of 
space, which in turn leads to a similar convergence of fiction and 
documentary with regard to film aesthetics, since we can no longer tell 
when the performance begins and when it ends. 
And yet, for all of these convergences – the technological convergence 
around the screen, and the spatial and temporal convergence that we see in 
terms of film content – I wish to argue today that these are based upon a 
more fundamental convergence, which is the convergence of the world in 
cinema. Furthermore, I shall argue that this convergence is itself predicated 
upon an ongoing ideology of divergence, of division, of separation, and of 
hierarchisation. In short, cinema continues to be business as usual. But 
perhaps more importantly, business as usual is increasingly becoming 
cinema. 
Screens proliferate to the point of ubiquity. I am surrounded by an 
endless array of screens – and if I find myself in a situation where I cannot 
see a screen, I need not worry, since at that moment I can take out the 
screen that I carry in my pocket and take a look at that one. I and many of 
my conspecifics are veritably addicted to, or at the very least dominated, by 
screens. How did this happen? 
I imagine that the reasons for the rise of the screens are multiple, ranging 
at the very least from the psychological to the historical to the cultural and to 
the physiological. Perhaps there is a narcissism attached to the screen, 
especially in an age in which I use my smartphone to update my Facebook 
profile and constantly check it to see who has been looking at me. Certainly 
the proliferation of screens is attached to a particular period, what we might 
loosely term the present, and screens have not always been so prominent. 
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Arguably not every culture is as screen-absorbed as the one(s) with 
which I am most familiar, namely the cultures of the Global North. And yet, 
there are strong reasons regarding why every human does or might look at 
screens if surrounded by them, and these are to do with the human 
mechanisms of attention. 
Our screens tend to involve bright colours and rapid changes in terms of 
editing, camera movement and/or what we see on the screen; they tend to 
feature humans that supposedly are most attractive, while the distortions in 
size (from the massive to the minute depending on the size of screen with 
which we are confronted) also serve to attract and to maintain our attention. 
Furthermore, the devices attached to the screens often emit loud and/or 
sonorous noises, which also arouse our attention. As numerous studies 
about human attention show, then, the kinds of images that we see on our 
screens accord more or less precisely with the kinds of things that arouse 
our attention: unusual things that make us ask whether what we are seeing 
is prey, predator or mate. Given that the human brain rewards itself when it 
has worked out whether it is prey, predator or mate that we are seeing, it 
makes sense that we want to go through this experience over and over 
again. Indeed, the neurotransmitters associated with attention are 
norepinephrine and acetylcholine (see, for example, Himmelheber et al, 
2000). The former is known more commonly in the UK as noradrenaline, 
which conveys the adrenaline-like dimension of attention, while the latter is 
not dissimilar to nicotine (nicotine imitates acetylcholine, and thus stimulates 
acetylcholine receptors in the brain; see, for example, Wu et al 2013). In 
other words, it may not be too grand an exaggeration to suggest that we are 
addicted to our screens. It is not, therefore, that we have a deficit of 
attention; it is that our attention constantly is over-aroused; we have a 
surplus of attention. 
And if it is cinema that arouses and maintains our attention, then it is 
perhaps unsurprising that it is the techniques developed in cinema that also 
proliferate and which fill those near-ubiquitous screens: physiologically we 
are predisposed to pay attention to those screens, whether we enjoy the 
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content of the screen or not. 
But more than this. Knowing that we look at screens, that we look at 
screens perhaps even more than we do the real world, then it is seemingly 
logical that one should try to monetize this mechanism and to turn 
attention into an economy. Not only do our survival instincts – looking out 
for prey, predators or mates – become part of this economy, but this 
economy becomes necessary for survival, in the sense that one’s business 
might go bust if one does not take part in or use the techniques developed 
in cinema, since if no one knows about your business or what you do/are 
selling (if no one pays attention to it), then your business might perish and 
your ability to survive is as a result compromised. In short, cinema affects 
the economy in such a way that nearly all businesses must become 
cinematic, or they must adopt what Jonathan Beller (2006) has called a 
cinematic mode of production. 
While there might be a case for medium specificity, therefore, I wish to 
suggest that the convergence point of the contemporary world is cinema – 
the techniques developed as part of its history, and the screens that play a 
central role in its proliferation. Indeed, few are the jobs that are not now tied 
to screens, with Ken Loach’s I, Daniel Blake (UK/France/Belgium, 2016) 
recently staging the demise of traditional labour as the title character is 
forced to become computer literate in an age when his skills as a carpenter 
are becoming increasingly redundant. To be clear: it is not that the screens 
that we look at are always playing what we might call films, although 
increasing amounts of information are passed on audiovisually, as we can 
see from the way in which newspaper websites increasingly carry video 
content, meaning that they are converging with television shows. 
Nonetheless, each has a cinematic logic, which is the central logic of 
contemporary capital: to gain attention and to put attention to work in a bid 
to make money. The best products are not the ones that make the most 
money; the products that garner the most attention are the ones that make 
the most money – and they do this through cinema. And so, a tool that we 
thought might show the world back to us, namely the cinematograph, in fact 
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changes the world, capitalizing upon our attention mechanisms in order to 
intensify a particular system of increasingly globalized behaviour, namely 
capital itself. If the world shaped cinema, it is perhaps more true to say that 
today cinema shapes the world; we do not measure cinema according to 
reality; we measure reality according to cinema and that which is not 
cinematic is as good as non-existent, a theme to which I shall return shortly. 
However, I presently wish to address how the convergence that is cinema 
involves not just a spatial convergence, in the sense that screens are 
everywhere and the screen becomes the focus of nearly all of our attention, 
but that it also involves a temporal convergence. I mean three things by this 
temporal convergence. Firstly, since we are always looking at screens and 
thus always paying attention to images and thus always taking part in the 
business of cinema, capital now becomes not a part of the day that 
rhythmically starts and stops, but it is constant, or endless. I wake up in the 
night and check my phone, which stays under my pillow, with my laptop on the 
floor next to my bed. In effect, there is now no time difference; just an 
ongoing hum. 
This is tied to a second convergence, which we might call something like 
the perpetual present, or an inability to retain memories. This is a very 
common experience: I am writing a paper to present at SOCINE XX, and I 
realize that I need quickly to check a passage from Max Horkheimer’s 
Eclipse of Reason (2013), and so I go online to see if I can find an electronic 
copy of that text. But before I get there, I see that I have three new emails in 
my gmail account, and so I check those – deleting two spam messages and 
responding to the third. Since I am checking emails, I check my work email 
and realize that I have to respond to one of those, from a student, quite 
urgently, but in order to do this properly, I have to consult their student 
profile, and so I must carry out various logins in order remotely to access 
the university’s system. I do this and respond to the email, only to see that I 
have another email asking for a meeting next week, and so I go over to my 
calendar and check that, add the meeting to my calendar, adding at the 
same time another meeting that I forgot earlier to add, before going back 
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and responding to the email. I get an announcement telling me that I have 
received a message on Facebook, so I go to that – someone has sent me a 
link to a website that looks relevant enough for work, and so I follow the link, 
read the story, reply to my friend who sent me the link with a cursory thank 
you, and then… I know that I have to do something online, but I cannot 
remember what. Oh well, I should go back to writing my paper for 
SOCINE… Oh yes, I wanted to check that passage from Horkheimer. And so 
the cycle begins again. To reiterate: it is not that I cannot attend to my essay, 
it is that my attention is, with my complicity, aroused on all sides: I have a 
surplus of attention. All time converges in a perpetual present, then, as I 
remember nothing, but just drift from attention-arousing image to attention-
arousing image. 
The third temporal convergence, meanwhile, is more profound, and it 
also finds an echo in Beller’s work on the attention economy. This 
convergence is the way in which cinema is the constitutive event of 
modernity, in that while modernity began long before cinema, and while 
cinema is now already 120 years old, the cinematic logic of capital was 
always there and continues to be at the heart of capital. The addiction to 
screens as opposed to being with the world is in effect present in all media, 
including shoes, clothes, buildings, agriculture, road surfaces, and, be it for 
better or for worse, for ensuring our comfort, warmth and survival or 
otherwise, these all involve processes of separation from as opposed to a 
convergence with the world. In effect, rather than a history full of surprises, 
my contention is that cinema destroys history, and it presents itself as the 
teleological beginning, centre and end of human time. The very illusory 
nature of this and any teleology demonstrates the religious dimension of 
cinema: we worship it as we worship money, since cinema is capital; and it 
also demonstrates the way in which cinema involves the divergence of 
humanity and the world, since the world itself does not necessarily share the 
same fate as humanity, although humanity is trying to make it so through the 
mutual destruction of both the planet and itself. In effect, cinema 
demonstrates that we are not in Plato’s cave (1987), watching shadows on a 
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wall, and from which we shall emerge dazzled and awe-inspired by reality, 
but that we are with the world and desperately trying to make our way into 
Plato’s cave, because reality is - or, at least in comparison to cinema, has 
become - too traumatic in its senselessness, in its very absence of 
teleology, for humans in their collective, cinema-induced insanity to bear. 
Cinema, then, crystallises the tendency under modernity for humans to 
separate themselves from the world and from each other and to seek to 
bury and/or control the world and our own animal instincts under clothes, 
concrete and cinematic appearances. Convergence, then, is underwritten 
by divergence on a global scale. 
The retreat into Plato’s cave also highlights how that which is not 
cinematic is as good as non-existent in a world in which cinema is the 
measure of reality as opposed to reality being the measure of cinema. If you 
are not on a screen somewhere, then no one knows that you exist. This is 
perhaps the central problem with the recent fantasy of living outside of 
cinematic society, Captain Fantastic (Matt Ross, USA, 2016). 
In this film, Ben (Viggo Mortensen) lives with his six children in the forests of 
the Pacific Northwest, raising them to read voraciously, from classic and 
modern literature to science books and Noam Chomsky, to speak numerous 
languages and to beultra-fit survivalists. Owing to the death of his wife and the 
children’s mother, they return to civilization, where they get a frosty reception, 
in particular from Jack (Frank Langella), the wealthy father of Ben’s late wife, 
Leslie (Trin Miller). While the film features various tribulations, in particular 
regarding whether Ben’s way of raising his children is good or appropriate, 
ultimately his children love him and they return to be with him even after Jack 
has tried to have them legally taken away from him. The film can be critiqued 
in various ways, including for its mythologisation of the outdoor life à la Ralph 
Waldo Emerson (1994) or Henry David Thoreau (1995), its glossing of various 
contradictions/plot holes (the family is repeatedly reliant on medical services 
for which they do not pay; somehow the children are fluent in six languages 
despite never having left the USA, or indeed interacted with other human 
beings), and for being a fantasy of re-empowered masculinity with still only 
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supporting, interchangeable roles for women. However, what I wish to 
suggest about the film is slightly different. 
At one point, Ben’s eldest son, Bo (George MacKay), learns that he has 
been accepted into more or less every Ivy League school in the USA, 
something that he achieved with the help of Leslie, making the applications 
with her behind Ben’s back. Ben tells Bo that this is a great achievement, but 
he also says to him that he does not need that world, and that Harvard, Yale, 
Princeton and the other universities are all precisely part of the world that 
they were seeking to leave behind. 
In some senses, one can take Ben’s point and understand that (at least 
in principle) Bo should not need a certificate from a high- brow university in 
order to validate him as a human being. And yet, if this were so, then how 
does it apply to this film, Captain Fantastic? Ben and his family do not own a 
television and they do not watch films, apparently, with books and music 
being their sole authorized entertainment media. If by implication, then, 
cinema is also part of this world that Ben has wanted to leave behind, then 
why does director Matt Ross make Captain Fantastic a film? Why does he 
not write it as a novel that thus more fittingly can convey a desire to escape 
the contemporary world and/or selected aspects of modernity more 
generally? The reason is because the family does not leave society in order 
to lead a new life. It leaves society in order to be able to come back to 
society and to present itself as empowered; in short, it leaves cinema in order 
to come back only as cinematic. This in part explains both why Captain 
Fantastic, for all of its pleasurable aspects, is not only unadventurous 
formally (it really wants to be cinematic in quite a conventional sense), but it 
also demonstrates how the death of the mother is really an excuse for the 
father to show what a good father he is – regardless of his advice to his son 
about not going to Brown or Stanford. Indeed, that advice surely is 
hypocritical; what we should have seen was a family of idiots living in the 
wilderness being validated, rather than a fantasy of self-reliant 
übermenschen. 
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In other words, while Captain Fantastic pretends to be a fantasy about 
living in a world without cinema, and thus in a world without capital, it in fact 
is cinema as usual, complete with its patriarchal law that everyone follows, 
even the recalcitrant son, Rellian (Nicholas Hamilton) who spends much of 
the movie trying to rebel against his father. 
However, for all that Captain Fantastic is a fantasy about disappearing off 
the grid, as it were, it also fails signally to recognise that the cinematic world in 
which we live is underpinned by two types of overlooked, invisible, and thus 
non- or only quasi-existent people, with cinema not allowing these different 
people democratically to converge, but rather relying structurally upon 
precisely their divergence, or separation. These two types of invisible people 
are the extremely rich and the poor. 
When I say that the extremely rich are invisible, what I really mean is that 
capital itself is invisible. Under the cinematic mode of production, visibility is key, 
at the expense, even, of our other senses and the other ways of engaging with 
the world that they offer (smell, touch and so on). In Martin Scorsese’s Wolf of 
Wall Street (USA, 2013), Leonardo DiCaprio’s Jordan Belfort at one point walks 
toward the camera, which itself tracks backward, explaining how an IPO works; 
he stops himself mid-sentence and says: ‘Look, I know you’re not following 
what I’m saying anyway, right? That’s... that’s okay, that doesn’t matter. The 
real question is this: was all this legal? Absolutely fucking not.’ In other words, 
no one understands how capital works, not least because its working cannot 
be shown; and in a culture in which the visible is validated above all else, if 
something cannot be shown, then quickly it is going to becoming boring – 
hence Belfort explaining how no one understands what he is saying. 
But more than being boring, it is in fact of vital importance that the 
workings of capital are invisible. For, in being invisible, and with 
visibility/cinema being the measure of reality (and not vice versa), one can 
always deny that capital actually exists. Where is the proof for it? Not in 
anything visible. We perhaps touch again here on the religious dimension of 
capital, the invisibility of which maintains its divinity. But more importantly, it is 
the deniability of capital that is what enables it to maintain its hegemonic 
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position in the world. Since there is no visible proof of exploitation, it becomes 
incredibly hard to show that there is exploitation and/or how it works. 
This leads us to the second group of invisible people, who are precisely 
those who are exploited most, namely the poor. I am not denying here the 
existence of what we might broadly define as a history of social realist 
cinema, and in which we see the plight of the world’s poor from migrant 
workers in Jean Renoir’s Toni (France, 1935) through to the eponymous 
Bicycle Thieves (Ladri di biciclette, Italy, 1948) in Vittorio de Sica, to 
exploited labourers in the films of the Dardenne brothers and the afore-
mentioned Ken Loach. But, on the whole, the poor remain invisible; 
divergence is the condition upon which convergence apparently can take 
place. And if it is visibility, or being cinematic, that is the measure of reality, 
then who are we to deny the desire of anyone to become visible if indeed 
they are (or at the very least feel) invisible, or excluded? Indeed, to increase 
the number of poor people in the world only increases the number of people 
seeking to become cinematic, and who as a result are worshippers at the 
altar of cinema-capital. If Captain Fantastic presents to us a fantasy about 
going off-grid, it is only the fantasy of an already empowered family (which is 
revealed as no less than a fantasy in its continuous complicity with the 
cinematic society that it claims otherwise to condemn). While going off-grid 
is a privileged bourgeois fantasy, then, being or feeling off-grid and seeking 
to become cinematic, recognized, and thus real (a human being as opposed 
to a barbarian), is a far more common struggle. 
We can see this tension between reality and cinema, between visibility 
and invisibility in cinema itself, for it uses these forms of invisibility in order 
to maintain its visibility. For, if computers and electronics more generally 
underpin the entire film industry (digital cameras, computers for post-
production work, digital projectors and computers for exhibition and 
reception), then no one knows really how these machines actually work; 
taking one apart would show only an array of wires and chips too small for 
the human eye to consider. Furthermore, while many films are about 
making films, few to none are about the labour that goes into making the 
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equipment that helps us to make and to consume films. There have been 
exposés on the awful working conditions and the low pay of those who 
make iPhones and iPads, while the mining industries for the main 
component materials for computers, including silicon, copper, iron and 
more, are also strewn with poor human rights records, low pay and terrible 
working conditions. Not only do we not know how films get made on a 
fundamental level, then, but we do not see how this equipment gets made, 
with the workers making that equipment also being invisible, and thus in 
many respects non-existent. If there is media convergence in the 
contemporary age, it is predicated upon a fundamental class divergence 
that is now globalized. 
This divergence is key to the running of the contemporary world. Sticking 
to the examples of filmmaking hardware and smartphones, if we lived in a 
world without exploitation, in which (in the spirit of Eduardo Galeano, 2009) 
the veins not just of Latin America but everywhere were left intact, and in 
which workers from the mining industries through to the assembling plants 
were paid decently, we would never be able to afford these products since 
they would be enormously expensive. As a result, images would not be 
produced, and the world as we know it would collapse – or at least the 
capitalist world would collapse, but likely with enormous wars as opposed to 
gleeful revolution. 
That convergence is predicated upon divergence is perhaps clear in the 
etymology of the word. As likely is obvious, the word comes from con-, 
meaning together, and the Latin vergere, meaning to tend or to incline, 
which in turn takes its root from wer-, meaning to turn or to bend. The 
term also has a sense of verge, or to provide with a border, implying that 
the term is implicitly linked with the sense of creating borders. What type 
of borders these might be is perhaps suggested in the fact that the Old 
French term verge means a rod or a wand, as well as a penis. Indeed, the 
earliest English use of the term was to denote a male member. Keeping to 
Old French, the phrase ‘to be under the authority of’ would have been 
translated as estre suz la verge de, with a sense of the verge, then, being 
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linked to patriarchal law, the penis perhaps functioning as something like a 
border or dividing line. 
If technological convergence is then based upon a fundamental divergence, 
it perhaps comes as no surprise that we currently are seeing attempts to 
reconnect with the world from which we have diverged. This is recognizable in 
particular in the ‘slow’ movement, including of course the growing prominence 
of slow cinema, the very slowness of which functions as a means to reconnect 
viewers with a world that is otherwise disappearing from the fast-moving 
screens, and thus increasingly disappearing from our sense of reality. That 
disappearing world can be characterised by the torpor of time itself. Conversely, 
that which is disappearing from view reaches toward cinema in order to try to 
remain relevant. Let us take philosophy, for example, which increasingly uses 
film in a bid to convince people of its ongoing relevance, as do numerous other 
university courses in an attempt to retain the attention and interest of would-
be students. 
However, a philosophy of cinema, or film and philosophy, remains 
beholden to cinema as the central convergence point of the contemporary 
world. Slow cinema, equally, is still cinema, even if a different kind of 
cinema. As Laruelle proposes non-philosophy in order to try to get back 
towards a world of connections and linkages as opposed to a world of 
division, separation and divergence, so might I propose non-cinema as a 
term to describe works that endeavor to highlight the exclusions that 
conventional cinema makes, not just in terms of political exclusions (few 
mainstream films are about transsexual sex workers à la Tangerine, Sean 
Baker, USA, 2015), but also in terms of exclusions that take place because 
of the very limits of the technology used to create cinema (certain lighting 
conditions, skin tones, durations, rhythms and sounds). These are films, 
therefore, that respond both thematically and formally to the divisions that 
cinema sews. 
However, I wonder that even a radical ‘non’ cinema is still too beholden 
to that which it opposes in order genuinely to bring about the democratic 
convergence that might otherwise be promised beyond the divergences of 
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the cinematic mode of production. Thinking of recent work by Slavoj Žižek 
(2010), who suggests that it is the entire system of value that should be 
opposed, rather than the reassignation of value in a fashion that is 
perceived as more democratic, it is not an oppositional cinema that can lead 
us out of the impasse, but rather an opposition to cinema. A complete 
rejection of cinema: never to watch or to make another film again. Speaking 
personally, as a filmmaker who makes films that are not really films, as a non-
cinematographer, as it were, this is a very difficult choice to make. Indeed, I 
am confronted with the power of my own addiction to images when I come to 
realize that I could hardly live in a world in which I could neither produce nor 
consume images. To imagine not watching another cat video, and the soul-
laughter that it produces, is impossible. 
More than this, though, I am deeply affected and influenced by cinema: it 
is embarrassing to confess it, but receiving attention has addictive qualities 
just like the arousal of attention. Indeed, one wonders that attention here is 
in fact not just looking and not being seen, or being seen but not looking 
back, but, rather, a profoundly social mechanism that is about looking and 
showing that one is looking (sharing videos on Facebook), and about being 
seen and knowing that one is being seen. In this sense, we can understand 
that attention is not dissimilar to shame: shame is always dependent on 
others – one has to be seen to be guilty in order to feel shame, in order to 
be ashamed. Indeed, the term in Portuguese for shame, vergonha, comes 
from the Latin term verecundia, which in turn is derived from the Proto-Italic 
werēōr and the Proto-Indo-European wer-, meaning to note or to sense, and 
which is a cognate with the Ancient Greek verb, ὁράω/horáō, meaning to see. 
If the convergences of the attention economy are predicated upon a 
divergence, we perhaps get towards a sense in which the shame of 
divergence is key to convergence; convergence is shameful – and in its 
shameful dimension, we understand that the divergence away from the 
world that is convergence is fully understood, desired, and not something of 
which we are unaware or ignorant (wer- is also the root for the English term 
awareness). 
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And so if we are shamed, but in some senses also shameless about the 
divergence of convergence (we know that we separate ourselves from the 
world; we know that we prefer Plato’s Cave to reality – and we shan’t do 
anything about it), then where are we to go? If I cannot give up filmmaking 
or watching cat videos, we realize not only that cinema has become entirely 
naturalized and that it perhaps cannot be renounced, but we also perhaps 
realize that our hope lies not with rejecting cinema outright, since this now 
cannot be done. Rather, we can return to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
(1985, p.94) and realize that as with capital it is not a revolution that will 
overthrow it, but that it is the very destiny of capital to reach its own 
conclusion, then so, too, is it the destiny of cinema to reach its own 
conclusion, without necessary input from a conscious and/or conscientious 
revolution in aesthetics. In other words, non-cinema (if I may continue using 
the term) is not so much an oppositional movement, but it is what we 
recognise in already existing cinema that announces the movement of 
cinema towards its own dissolution. It is the very unsustainability of cinema, 
and thus by extension capital, collapsing under its own weight. 
The final issue becomes, then, whether cinema-capital is co- extensive 
with Earth. In Elysium (Neill Blomkamp, USA, 2013) and Interstellar 
(Christopher Nolan, USA/UK, 2014) both, we see humans having left Earth 
and created a simulation of the planet in miniature in space. Both are in 
some senses pastoral ideals. They masquerade as temporary homes for 
humanity while they work out what to do with themselves in terms of healing 
Earth or finding another planet on which to live. But really, both are the 
fantasy of humans to live in Plato’s Cave, not least involving the exclusion 
of/divergence from the poor that is also at the root of capital’s convergences. 
If to exhaust capital, one exhausts the Earth, then humanity faces 
cataclysm: to exhaust the Earth is likely to exhaust humanity, since the 
fantasies of Elysium and Interstellar are from being realized in the actual 
world that we inhabit, the dreams and schemes of Elon Musk 
notwithstanding. These are fantasy spaces that truly do diverge from reality, 
which is perhaps better represented in a film like Gravity (Alfonso Cuarón, 
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UK/USA, 2013), informed as it is by the Third World sensibility of its director: 
being out in space is chaotic, and the machines in which we travel there both 
break down and are torn apart simply by floating debris. As per Gravity, the 
only hope is of getting back to Earth. Of finally converging once again with 
reality. The question is whether there is a reality left once cinema-capital has 
done with Earth and/or itself. To this question, I cannot give an answer. But in 
not having a set answer, in not knowing the future as an already-controlled 
thing (as opposed to an open-ended time), hope can be born. Let us hope 
and let us continue working towards a world in which the divergences that 
underwrite the superficial convergences of capital-cinema are overcome, 
and in which we work back towards converging with our planet and with 
each other. 
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